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Comments:

The Governing Dynamics of State
Marijuana Legislation: Game Theory and
the Need for Interstate Cooperation
Adam R. Scott*
ABSTRACT
Social views evolve over time, but lasting societal change requires
affirmative and strategic action. In modern American society, one social
issue that requires strategic action is the legalization of marijuana through
state legislation. Disagreements between state and federal law are common
in a federal governmental structure. However, the individualized nature of
state marijuana legislation and unpredictable federal prosecutorial
discretion present novel legal issues that must be proactively addressed.
Since 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) has categorized
marijuana as a “Schedule I” drug. Despite the unwavering criminalization
of marijuana under federal law, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia now legally permit marijuana use in at least one form.
Consequently, the use and possession of marijuana is no longer a binary
issue of right or wrong. Instead, state marijuana legislation now raises new
social and legal concerns impacting all federal and state governments.
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. Thank
you to everyone who offered their love, support, and guidance throughout this journey. I
hope this Comment inspires thoughtful and productive discussions in the future. Never
settle for the status quo.
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Importantly, this Comment does not endorse a specific position on
the use or possession of marijuana, nor does it offer a new solution that
will “fix” the issue overnight. Instead, this Comment utilizes existing
scholarship to illustrate how economic game theory principles can produce
new insights and strategies regarding marijuana legalization in America.
More specifically, this Comment uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to
evaluate state marijuana legislation and to explain how increased interstate
collaboration can mitigate the uncertainty created by unchecked
federalism and prosecutorial discretion. Above all, readers should
critically consider how game theory principles can help address other
complex social issues in the future.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 770
I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS .............................................................................. 772
A. The Basics of American Federalism ............................................ 772
1. The Basic Objectives of Federalism ...................................... 773
2. The Constitutional Origins of Federalism .............................. 774
3. Determining the Limits of Federalism ................................... 775
B. The Growth of State Marijuana Legislation ................................. 777
1. The Origins of U.S. Marijuana Regulation ............................ 778
2. The Controlled Substances Act .............................................. 780
3. Modern Marijuana Use in the United States .......................... 781
4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Marijuana Use .......................... 783
a. The Cole Memo .............................................................. 785
b. The Sessions Memo ........................................................ 787
C. Game Theory ............................................................................... 788
1. Basic Assumptions ................................................................. 789
2. The Nash Equilibrium ............................................................ 790
3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game .............................................. 792
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 792
A. Modeling the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma .............................. 794
1. General Assumptions ............................................................. 794
2. Identifying the “Nash Equilibrium” ....................................... 795
B. Analyzing the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma ............................. 796
C. Recommendations Moving Forward ............................................ 798
III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 799

I.

INTRODUCTION

Complex social issues often demand gradual change and strategic
cooperation, not quick and straightforward solutions.1 When complex
social issues are not promptly addressed, growing tensions can lead to
1. See Dietrich Dorner & Joachim Funke, Complex Problem Solving: What It Is and
What It Is Not, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., July 11, 2017, at 1.
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selfish choices that undermine basic democratic goals and values.2 One
modern example of this phenomenon is the growth of states legalizing the
use and possession of marijuana in contradiction to federal criminal law.3
Conflict between state and federal law is not novel in the American federal
system.4 Nonetheless, the complex nature of modern state marijuana
legislation raises important questions that must be addressed, especially
the role of federalism and the limits of constitutional power in American
society.5
The modern conflict between federal law and state marijuana
legislation is also well-documented by academics and legal practitioners
alike.6 The legalization of marijuana is also a socially divisive topic.7
Consequently, this Comment does not endeavor to contradict past
scholarship, nor does it claim to provide a universal solution that will “fix”
current disagreements between state and federal law.8 Instead, this
Comment uses game theory to offer new perspectives and practical tools
to address the intersecting of federalism, prosecutorial discretion, and state
marijuana legislation.9 More specifically, this Comment uses the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game to illustrate how interstate collaboration can
revitalize traditional notions of federalism and eventually decrease
tensions caused by individualized and conflicting state marijuana laws.10
This Comment also aspires to provide a new evaluative framework that
2. See, e.g., Kevin Arceneaux, Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation
in the United States?, 35 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 297, 299–301 (2005) (discussing the
important role citizens play in federal society, especially when confronted with the historic
question concerning “the amount of authority that should belong to the national
government”); Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How a Democracy Dies, NEW REPUBLIC
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/31O3qvn (noting that democracies work best when
“constitutions are reinforced by norms of mutual toleration and restraint in the exercise of
power”).
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. For the purposes of this paper, the legalization of marijuana through state
legislation will be referred to as “state marijuana legislation.” For more information on
American federalism, see infra Section II.A.
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See, e.g., TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE
LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (2014); TODD
GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 1, 7–11
(2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, Marijuana Laws and Federalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 857, 857–
62 (2018); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation,
62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (“The ongoing clash over marijuana laws raises questions
of tension and cooperation between state and federal governments and forces policymakers
and courts to address the preemptive power of federal drug laws. Divergent federal and
state laws also create debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states
that are pioneering new approaches to marijuana control.”).
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.B; see also infra Part III.
9. See infra Parts II–III.
10. See infra Sections II.B–.C.
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can be used to understand and address other complex social issues in the
future.11
I.

BACKGROUND CONCEPTS

Marijuana use and regulation are not new issues in American
society.12 For over fifty years, the utility and legality of marijuana have
remained virtually unchanged under federal law.13 Conversely, social
views have evolved quite drastically during the past half-century.14 Today,
two questions warrant consideration: (1) what caused the modern disparity
between state and federal marijuana law; and (2) what can be done to
alleviate current tensions and promote state and federal cooperation in the
future?15
A.

The Basics of American Federalism

Federal law officially criminalized the use and possession of
marijuana in 1970.16 Yet after thirty years of social protest, California was
the first state to contradict federal law and legalize marijuana use for
medicinal purposes.17 More importantly, California’s marijuana
legislation created a ripple effect that has led to the passage of marijuanarelated state legislation in 33 states and the District of Columbia.18 As
public support for state marijuana legislation grows, state legislators must
grapple with the role of federalism, the boundaries of constitutional law,
and whether the power to legalize marijuana rests with the states or the
federal government.19
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Section II.B.1.
13. See infra Section II.B.2.
14. See infra Section II.B.3.
15. See infra Parts II–III.
16. See infra Sections II.B.1–.2.
17. See Dean M. Nickles, Note, Federalism and State Marijuana Legislation, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2016) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
(West 2014)).
18. See infra Section II.B.3; see also Keith Speights, Timeline for Marijuana
Legalization in the United States: How the Dominoes Are Falling, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 2,
2020, 1:06 PM), https://bit.ly/2SfM9Xk; cf. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING
MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 2–5 (2015),
https://bit.ly/2vzgfNR (summarizing marijuana-related changes in public sentiment across
U.S. states, as well as reasons why state marijuana legislation is now the subject of serious
social and political debate).
19. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–18, 28–29 (2005) (declaring that
Congress has the legal and constitutional authority to regulate marijuana through
preemptive federal law (first citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); and
then citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)); Lea Brilmayer, A General
Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State Decriminalization of Marijuana, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 895, 921–23 (2017) (comparing the jurisdictional overlap of the federal system and
individual state government systems); Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 859 (“No state is
required to have a law prohibiting or regulating marijuana. Indeed, it would violate the
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The Basic Objectives of Federalism

The term “federalism” refers to the institutional “division of [shared]
authority” between individual state governments and the United States
federal government.20 Although the term “federalism” never appears in the
United States Constitution (“Constitution”),21 the concept of federalism is
a foundational principle of American society.22 Federalism remains a
relevant topic of modern society because the scope of federal power is a
question that “perpetually aris[es], and will probably continue to arise, as
long as our system shall exist.”23
Federalism is not a passive political theory.24 Federalism is a practical
tool that can help resolve issues within individual states and create unity
amongst otherwise independent states.25 Federalism can also galvanize
broad social change by allowing individual states to develop experimental
solutions to local problems, which can later be adopted nationwide.26

Tenth Amendment for Congress to compel states to have and enforce laws prohibiting
possession of marijuana. . . . The more difficult arising issue is whether states, by legalizing
marijuana and then regulating and taxing it, are impeding the federal government from
achieving its goals in making marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance.”).
20. See Robert Longley, What Is Federalism? Definition and How It Works in the
US, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://bit.ly/2sZi2uV; see also George Charles Roche
III, American Federalism: Origins, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Dec. 1, 1966),
https://bit.ly/2zrVBxB.
21. See Linda R. Monk, Federalism, PBS.ORG, https://to.pbs.org/2F018Bm (last
visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Martin Diamond, The Ends of Federalism, 3 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 129, 130–37 (1973) (discussing the historic evolution of federalism and its
role in American society).
22. See Monk, supra note 21 (discussing the underlying American theme of “E
Pluribus Unum,” which means “out of many states, one nation”); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 39 (James Madison) (“The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, . . . neither a national
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.”).
23. Monk, supra note 21 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819)
(opinion of Marshall, C.J.)).
24. See Robert A. Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 272 (2005) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing that
states serve as valuable guardians of the people’s liberties . . . [and] protect citizens from
the overwhelming power of the national government.”)).
25. See Colin Roth, Marijuana Legislation Is Federalism in Action, WASH.
EXAMINER (July 2, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://washex.am/36x4KDL (arguing that Clintonera federalism “changed welfare from permanent dependency to a program that assists
needy families while incentivizing reentry into the workforce”); see also Katie Tubb, How
Federalism Is Making a Difference on Western Lands, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2019)
https://herit.ag/37EuKhM (explaining that states are best placed to manage local
environmental issues, rather than relying on federal agencies to offer “blanket solutions to
nuanced problems”). But see Pietro S. Nivola, Why Federalism Matters, BROOKINGS (Oct.
1, 2005), https://brook.gs/2uC2gag (arguing federalism should empower states to
experiment and respond to local issues, but actual benefits are “a matter of considerable
debate”).
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Federalism also “promot[es] competition and embrac[es] diversity”27
based on the belief that states can often resolve local issues better than
bureaucratic federal agencies.28
2.

The Constitutional Origins of Federalism

According to scholars, federalism is an evolutionary constitutional
principle that demands regular and proactive consideration within modern
American society.29 Because the drafters of the Constitution could not
predict the future, the Constitution purposefully uses malleable principles,
like federalism, to establish a national system that can adapt and address
present and future concerns.30 Similarly, the Preamble to the Constitution
demonstrates that the drafters wanted to establish “a more perfect Union”31
that could protect and preserve states’ rights within a broader national
framework.32
27. .See Roth, supra note 25 (“Lawmakers of both parties too often look for big, onesize-fits-all solutions that turn our national politics into an existential zero-sum game over
controversial issues. If Republicans and Democrats can agree, in principle, on a federalist
solution to marijuana, it just might open the door to more federalist solutions on other hotbutton issues.”); cf. Will Kenton, Zero-Sum Game, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2uS1TYZ (defining zero-sum as a situation “in which one person’s gain is
equivalent to another’s loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is zero”).
28. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 580 (2007) (explaining
that interjurisdictional regulatory problems, like national emergencies and environmental
issues, are matters of “such local concern and/or expertise that it would not make sense to
attack the problem as an exclusively national regulatory project” and thus the only effective
result “flows from a collaborative approach”).
29. See The Evolution of American Federalism, LUMEN LEARNING,
https://bit.ly/2O86VHa (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“The Constitution sketches a federal
framework that aims to balance the forces of decentralized and centralized governance in
general terms; it does not flesh out standard operating procedures that say precisely how
the states and federal governments are to handle all policy contingencies imaginable. . . .
This has led to changes in the configuration of federalism over time, changes corresponding
to different historical phases that capture distinct balances between state and federal
authority.”). See generally EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-518 GOV,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 1776 TO 1997: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (1997) (outlining the historic
evolution of American federalism).
30. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1994);
cf. U.S. Founding Documents, CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2TTWEz3 (last visited Jan.
26, 2020) (providing the documents believed to be instrumental to the founding and
philosophy of the United States).
31. U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism:
Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both, 86 YALE L.J.
1273, 1280 (1977) (noting that the Framers believed a “voluntary association [of states]
was inadequate”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Preamble’s Significance for Constitutional
Interpretation, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://bit.ly/34AC4dE (last visited Apr. 12, 2020)
(noting that the Preamble has “significant implications both for how the Constitution is to
be interpreted and applied and who has the power of constitutional interpretation”).
32. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 5 (2d ed.
1987) (explaining that America’s founding documents intended to “facilitate national
coordination and union while preserving sub-national centers of political control and

2020 MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: GAME THEORY & INTERSTATE COOP.

775

Unlike the unitary system used in Great Britain,33 the drafters of the
Constitution desired a political system “where it is necessary as a people
to speak with one voice . . . but it [also] allows countless voices to be heard
on matters pertaining to the day-to-day general welfare.”34 Although the
Constitution does not mention federalism by name, there is no doubt that
the Constitution intends to simultaneously protect individual liberties,
while promoting national cohesion through the strategic delegation of
power between state and federal governments.35 Today, the question is not
whether federalism exists, but rather how constitutional powers should be
divided between individual states and a more dominant federal
government.36
3.

Determining the Limits of Federalism

In addition to the literal division of constitutional powers between
federal and state authority, federalism also demands a cohesive balance of
powers amongst individual states.37 In other words, federalism should
balance state and federal power through compromise, not selfish unilateral
conduct.38 True balance requires states to develop their own partnership
based upon shared objectives and goals within modern society.39
Although the notion of shared powers may appear simple, the basic
goals of federalism are often confused by vague language and varying
constitutional interpretations.40 In theory, the Tenth Amendment says that
all powers not expressly given to the federal government “are reserved to
choice”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that federalism
should benefit the citizens of all states), NO. 46 (James Madison) (explaining that national
and state governments “are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers”).
33. See Federalism, USHISTORY.ORG, https://bit.ly/2U2Mqj8 (last visited Apr. 22,
2020).
34. Akhil Reed Amar & Douglas W. Kmiec, Perspectives on the Constitution:
Understanding Our Constitution, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://bit.ly/2Bovcmh (last visited
Apr. 20, 2020).
35. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Section II.A.3.
37. See Hearing on The Federalism Debate: Why Doesn’t Washington Trust the
States? Before the H. Subcomm. on Human Res. & Intergovernmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on Government Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 113–18 (1995) (statement of
Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato
Institute) (testifying before Congress regarding the need for balanced relationships between
state and federal governments), https://bit.ly/38EQREQ.
38. See id.; see also Lawrence Jia, The Remnants of Federalism, HARV. POL. REV.
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2uQ2YAK.
39. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 116; see also GLEN KRUTZ ET AL., AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 2E 82–90 (Sylvie Waskiewicz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2019),
https://bit.ly/2VFhAhs; Tivas Gupta, The Future of Federalism, HARV. POL. REV. (Sept.
24, 2019), https://bit.ly/2vybx3h.
40. See Kramer, supra note 30, at 1485 (noting that the complexity of federalism
often “feels a bit like joining the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant”).
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the States” and their local legislatures.41 In practice, the delegation of
constitutional power to states is often overshadowed by general and
specific powers prioritized for the three federal branches of government.42
For example, the Constitution states that Congress “has legal authority as
delegated to it [specifically] under the Constitution.”43 The Constitution
also grants various powers to the President of the United States that impact
the executive branch, the military, and the nation as a whole.44 Finally, the
Constitution grants the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)
the power to interpret the Constitution, to determine the proper balance of
constitutional powers, and to define the legality of state and federal laws.45
The federal government enjoys a wide range of specific and general
powers under the Constitution.46 Although the Tenth Amendment
promises to reserve constitutional powers to the states, the practical reality
is that the federal government’s general powers can be used to
purposefully limit what “remaining” powers are actually delegated to the
states.47 One modern application of the Tenth Amendment involves the

41. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
42. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (enumerating the powers of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating specific and general congressional
powers, including the ability to “declare war” and to create “all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers”); see also ANDREW
NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45323, FEDERALISM-BASED LIMITATIONS ON
CONGRESSIONAL POWER: AN OVERVIEW, at intro. note, 1-6 (2018), https://bit.ly/2HinXP5.
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the President power to specific power to
nominate “Judges of the supreme Court” and the general power to appointment “Officers
of the United States,” including the U.S. Attorney General); see also 28 U.S.C. § 503
(2012) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an
Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is the head of the Department
of Justice.”).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405
(1816) (offering judicial affirmation that the federal government is “one of enumerated
powers”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–80 (1803) (establishing the principle of
judicial review); The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUP. CT.,
https://bit.ly/2IziyCw (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (“As the final arbiter of the law, the
[Supreme] Court is charged with ensuring the American people the promise of equal justice
under law and . . . functions as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution.”); cf. Charles
Wise & Rosemary O’Leary, Intergovernmental Relations and Federalism in
Environmental Management and Policy: The Role of the Courts, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150,
151 (1997) (“[T]he courts can use their powers of judicial review to allocate decision power
not only to agencies at various levels of government, but also to themselves as they decide
the grounds for and scope of judicial review. How the courts implement their overlapping
roles has profound effects for both management of public programs and the nature of the
federal system in the United States.”).
46. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
47. See Tenth Amendment: Effect of Provision on Federal Powers, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://bit.ly/3eAGZzR (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) (discussing varying judicial views on
the scope and power of the Tenth Amendment); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 505, 512 (1988) (holding that “[t]he Tenth Amendment limits on Congress’ authority
to regulate state activities are structural, not substantive—that is, the States must find their
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conflict between federal drug law, state marijuana legislation, and general
police powers.48 On one hand, states have “general police powers to enact
legislation concerning health, safety, welfare, and morals that are inherent
to government.”49 On the other hand, federal government officials have
the discretionary ability to intervene in state activities that affect national
interests.50 Although state drug legislation could be considered a
permissible exercise of state police power, modern state marijuana
legislation illustrates how the federal government can intervene and
impact state law without enumerated constitutional powers.51
Additionally, the executive branch adds significant confusion to the state
marijuana legislation debate by selectively enforcing federal law through
the unchecked discretion of federal prosecutors.52
B.

The Growth of State Marijuana Legislation

Modern marijuana legislation represents a collective action problem
that requires improved understanding and strategic cooperation amongst
individual states.53 According to the Tenth Amendment, all powers not
delegated to the federal government “are reserved to the States.”54 In
theory, the Tenth Amendment gives states the autonomy to make their own
laws and to act as “laboratories of democracy.”55 In practice, the federal
government is often more powerful than any one state and can interject

protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through
judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity”).
48. See infra Section II.B; see also J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Divided We
Stand: Medical Marijuana and Federalism, HEALTH LAW., June 2015, at 17, 18–20.
49. See MARK K. OSBECK & HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A NUTSHELL
144 (2017).
50. See id. at 144–46.
51. See infra Section II.B.2.
52. See infra Section II.B.4.
53. See Richard C. Rich, A Cooperative Approach to the Logic of Collective Action:
Voluntary Organizations and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 17 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 5,
10–12 (1988); cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY 1, 83, 110 (2003) (noting that
“the prisoners’ dilemma characterizes the relationships that confront states, and nations, in
choosing whether to enact special interest legislation that limits free trade” and states
generally act in ways that attempt “to secure the benefit of a pure Nash equilibrium
strategy”).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Tenth Amendment: Scope and Purpose, LEGAL
INFO. INST., https://bit.ly/2TZ7t6f (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (explaining that the initial
goal of the Tenth Amendment was to “allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully
their reserved powers” (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
55. New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Laboratories of Democracy
Database, NEW AM., https://bit.ly/38ppyhX (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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itself into state issues without concern.56 Consequently, modern societal
issues require a better understanding of what the Constitution says and also
how to apply its precepts in light of modern social and political realities.57
The American federal system permits cooperation amongst the
federal branches of government, as well as between state and federal
actors.58 Unfortunately, cooperation is not required and often treated as a
last resort.59 Consequently, states often pursue individual state interests,
while federal entities similarly pursue federal interests.60 Additionally,
discussions of federalism often cite to the Tenth Amendment as “a bulwark
against federal intrusion on state authority and individual liberty.”61
Unfortunately, the vague language of the Tenth Amendment offers little
guidance to resolve conflicts regarding the appropriate balance of state and
federal powers.62 Although federalism anticipates disagreements between
state and federal law, complex social issues like state marijuana legislation
still require proactive action to avoid negatively impacting interstate
relations that could lead to broader social harms.63
1.

The Origins of U.S. Marijuana Regulation

Marijuana use can be traced back to Asia around the year 500 B.C.64
Marijuana has also existed in America since the early seventeenth
century,65 and questions of regulation and legality only arose around
1906.66 Although the Food and Drug Act of 1906 only indirectly regulated
56. See Marcus Hawkins, A Definition of Federalism: The Case for Reinvigorating
State’s Rights, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/3coFdjY.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.; see also Maxwell A. Cameron & Tulia G. Falleti, Federalism and the
Subnational Separation of Powers, 35 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 245, 254–55 (2005)
(explaining that federalism does not impose specific rules on the federal government, but
it does recognize that state and federal government systems are “each supreme in its own
sphere”).
60. See Hawkins, supra note 56.
61. Charles Cooper, The Constitution in One Sentence: Understanding the Tenth
Amendment, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2011), https://herit.ag/2Xv8iWe.
62. See ENGDAHL, supra note 32, at 9 (“Attempts to use the tenth amendment to
restrict federal power are made from time to time; but in the long run such attempts always
and inevitably fail. The reason is that the amendment . . . affirms that what is not delegated
to the United States is reserved, but says nothing to clarify what has been delegated and
what has not been.”).
63. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 240–41 (discussing how different
marijuana-related legislation amongst neighboring states causes practical concerns like
confusion regarding the applicability of federal law).
64. See Marijuana, HISTORY.COM (Oct. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/3aHJoqq.
65. See id.; see also Research Guide: History of Marijuana Regulation in the United
States, U. GA. SCH. LAW (Oct. 29, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://bit.ly/2St3j5g.
66. See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed
1938) (providing an informal regulation of marijuana by “preventing the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs,
medicines, and liquors, and for regulating traffic therein”).
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marijuana passing through interstate commerce,67 the law paved the way
for the eventual criminalization of marijuana under both state and federal
law.68
By the late 1920s, marijuana became a topic of significant federal
concern.69 After the financial collapse of 1929, the ensuing “Great
Depression” created widespread unemployment, which in turn “escalated
public and governmental concern about the problem of marijuana.”70
Additionally, other factors contributed to negative social perceptions of
marijuana, including a governmental focus on familial welfare, the impact
of drugs on children,71 and the general social perception that drug use led
to crime and broad social disorder.72
Over time, the criminalization of marijuana has become deeply
engrained in modern American society, leading to a variety of social and
political consequences.73 Notably, federal drug policies largely prevented
67. See id.; see also Did You Know . . . Marijuana Was Once a Legal Cross-Border
Import?, CBP.GOV (Dec. 20, 2019), https://bit.ly/2FnQOCF.
68. See LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 2–8 (2014); see also Milestones in U.S.
Food and Drug Law History, FDA.GOV (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/37mWExB;
Marijuana Timeline, FRONTLINE, https://to.pbs.org/2xzyhOg (last visited Apr. 12, 2020)
(“After the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Mexican immigrants flooded into the U.S.,
introducing to American culture the recreational use of marijuana.” (citing Marihuana Tax
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970) (the first federal law
to regulate the “importation, cultivation, possession and/or distribution of marijuana”)).
69. The Great Depression began in 1929 and lasted until 1939. See Richard H. Pells
& Christina D. Romer, Great Depression, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2U9a6lq.
70. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 68; see also LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN
FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43164, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 n.16 (2014) (“Congressional testimony
indicated that marijuana, while it was a problem in the Southwest United States starting in
the mid-1920s, became a national menace in the mid-1930s (1935-1937).”).
71. See, e.g., H.J. Anslinger, Marijuana, Assassin of Youth, AM. MAG., July 1937, at
1; Eric Schlosser, More Reefer Madness, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1997, at 90,
https://bit.ly/2KrnziW; Stephen Siff, The Illegalization of Marijuana: A Brief History, 7
ORIGINS: OHIO ST. U., no. 8, May 2014, at 1, https://bit.ly/2UTgGgS; Becky Little, Why the
US Made Marijuana Illegal, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/3bFgqI4.
72. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA POLICY GAP AND THE
PATH FORWARD 42 (2017).
73. See, e.g., Zhuang Hao & Benjamin Cowan, The Cross-Border Spillover Effects of
Recreational Marijuana Legalization 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 23426, 2017), https://bit.ly/2FFHcRV (noting that recreational marijuana legalization
caused a “sharp increase in marijuana possession arrests of border counties relative to nonborder counties in both the Colorado and Washington regions”); Dominic Miranda,
Legalized Weed in Illinois Affects Neighboring States Like Indiana, WTHI-TV 10 NEWS
(Jan. 2, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://bit.ly/2FIHIPe. But see Report: Marijuana Legalization
Not Associated with Adverse ‘Spillover’ Effects in Neighboring States, NORML.ORG (Oct.
17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2slrDfi (arguing that “[a]dult-use marijuana legalization laws are
not associated with any significant increase in cannabis-related criminal activity in
neighboring states or counties” (citing ERIN J. FARLEY & STAN ORCHOWSKY, NAT’L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., PUB. NO. 253137, MEASURING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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marijuana-focused medical research throughout the twentieth century.74
Today, the absence of marijuana-related medical research is not only
unfortunate, but it is also used to justify the continued criminalization of
marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled Substances
Act (“CSA”).75
2.

The Controlled Substances Act

On October 27, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon signed the CSA
into law.76 Codified under Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,77 the CSA allows the federal
government to regulate the lawful “[production], possession, use,
importation, and distribution of certain drugs, substances, and precursor
chemicals.”78 The CSA also classifies regulated substances into “one of
five schedules based on [their] medical use, potential for abuse, and safety
or dependence liability.”79 Schedule I is the most restrictive category and
lists over 240 substances considered to have a high potential for abuse and
no accepted medical benefit.80

SYSTEM IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND DECRIMINALIZATION USING STATE
DATA, at iv (2019), https://bit.ly/2TdFuPK)).
74. See, e.g., Paul Armentano, 35 Years of Prohibition, NORML.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2UgVAIK (citing U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE,
MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972), https://bit.ly/2RPbCYM); David
Downs, The Science behind the DEA’s Long War on Marijuana, SCI. AM. (Apr. 19, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2GPUWu1 (arguing that “listing cannabis among the world’s deadliest drugs
ignores decades of scientific and medical data”).
75. See infra Section II.B.2.
76. See Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–14 (2018)); see also JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL
OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 1–3 (2019); SACCO, supra note 68, at 5.
77. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2010)).
78. SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 2; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
29 (2005) (holding that the CSA is “a valid exercise of federal power . . . [used to] conquer
drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances”).
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2018); see also BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34635, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 2 & n.14
app. (2012); The Controlled Substances Act, DEA.GOV, https://bit.ly/2RP2bZw (last
visited Feb. 2, 2020) (discussing how to amend current schedules); SACCO & FINKLEA,
supra note 70, at 2 & n.11.
80. For an annual update of all regulated substances, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11–.15
(2019). For additional information, see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENF’T AGENCY,
Foreword to LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, REGULATED
CHEMICALS (2020), https://bit.ly/2SakY0o (“[S]ection 812 of the CSA lists only those
substances which were controlled in 1970 when the law was enacted. Since then, over 200
substances have been added, removed, or transferred from one schedule to another.”).
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Modern Marijuana Use in the United States

Marijuana has been listed as a Schedule I drug since 1970.81 Although
many Schedule I drugs have a high potential for abuse and no accepted
medical benefit, modern social support for marijuana is slowly changing
state and federal opinion.82 In fact, the characterization of marijuana under
the CSA is not only a point of concern among recreational marijuana users,
but also medical advocates and non-users with practical benefits of the
substance in mind.83
Social views involving marijuana have drastically changed over
time.84 Less than three decades ago, marijuana was illegal in all 50 states.85
Today, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have some form of
legislation allowing the use of marijuana under specific conditions.86
Although support for marijuana continues to increase,87 attempts to change
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(1), (c)(c)(10) (2018); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, DRUGS OF ABUSE 9, 20 (2017), https://bit.ly/31juguS; Drug
Scheduling, DEA.GOV, https://bit.ly/33D9yHR (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (listing other
Schedule I drugs like heroin, ecstasy, and LSD); What is medical marijuana?, NAT’L INST.
ON DRUG ABUSE, https://bit.ly/2S5Ekn2 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); YEH, supra note 79,
at 2 & n.16 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1) (2017)) (explaining how the CSA was used
alongside the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to “place a drug or substance, on
a temporary basis, into Schedule I when necessary to avoid an ‘imminent hazard to public
safety’”).
82. See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 689, 689–92 (2015) (“So much energy has been directed at the debate about
whether to change federal marijuana laws that the question of how to change them has been
almost an afterthought. Barring a dramatic political reversal, however, it is no longer a
matter of whether but when, and that makes the how of federal marijuana reform
increasingly important.”); see also Justin McCarthy, Record-High Support for Legalizing
Marijuana Use in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 25, 2017), https://bit.ly/2IJzTrF (analogizing the rise
of social support for marijuana to support for same-sex marriage).
83. See, e.g., Earl L. Carter & Earl Blumenauer, If marijuana remains a Schedule I
substance, we can never do the research everyone knows we need, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29,
2019, 10:10 AM), https://nbcnews.to/2tlFVwM (explaining that the CSA limits legitimate
medical access to marijuana and creates barriers to medical research); Kerry Cork &
Hudson B. Kingston, Staff Att’y’s, Pub. Health Law Ctr. at Mitchell Hamline Sch. of Law,
Webinar, What if Marijuana Were NOT a Schedule 1 Drug?: Legal and Policy Implications
(June 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/3aZx8Sl (discussing how marijuana’s designation under the
CSA negatively impacts international treaties and medical research); Christopher
Ingraham, The government spent $18 million destroying marijuana plants last year, WASH.
POST (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:18 AM), https://wapo.st/37SlHtF.
84. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://bit.ly/39Z6f0c.
85. See Speights, supra note 18.
86. See id.; see also Map of Marijuana Legality by State, DISA GLOBAL SOLUTIONS,
https://bit.ly/2H2fqj2 (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) [hereinafter State Marijuana Map].
87. See Hannah Hartig & Abigail Geiger, About six-in-ten Americans support
marijuana legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://pewrsr.ch/2RzZQzp; see also
Background of the Issue, PROCON.ORG (Dec. 27, 2018, 3:02 PM), https://bit.ly/2QidpT1
(“More than half of US adults, over 128 million people, have tried marijuana, despite it
being an illegal drug under federal law.” (citing Marist Poll: Weed & The American
Family, MARIST INST. FOR PUB. OP. (Apr. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2oqJiuA)); From
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federal legislation continue to fail and thus marijuana continues to cause
significant tension between state actors and federal government officials.88
States with marijuana-related legislation are not exactly alike.89 In
fact, states with similar levels of social support for marijuana-related
legislation often do not share similar goals or beliefs regarding the use of
marijuana.90 Importantly, states with marijuana legislation often differ in
two ways. First, state marijuana legislation can permit the use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes, recreational purposes, or both.91 Second, state
marijuana legislation either formally legalizes or merely decriminalizes
the use and possession of marijuana.92
The differences amongst state marijuana laws are not surprising
because every state is comprised of diverse constituents who require
individualized approaches to the same topic.93 States have also passed
marijuana legislation at different times and under different
Prohibition to Progress: A Status Report on Marijuana Legalization, DRUGPOLICY.ORG
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/2E2YJ4T [hereinafter Status Report].
88. See Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032,
115th Cong. §§ 1-2 (2018) (describing a failed Congressional attempt to combat tensions
between state and federal laws by eliminating federal interference in state legalization
efforts without modifying the CSA); see also Tom Angell, Congress Votes To Block Feds
From Enforcing Marijuana Laws In Legal States, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 5:37 PM),
https://bit.ly/373HuNP (citing H.R. 3055, 116th Cong. § 531 (2019) (as passed by House,
June 25, 2019)); Jonathan Martin, Gregoire to DEA: Make marijuana a legal drug,
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:51 AM), https://bit.ly/2M4wGG8 (discussing how the
governors of Rhode Island and Washington “petitioned the DEA to reclassify marijuana,
recognize it has therapeutic value and allow it be treated as a prescription drug”); 2020
Marijuana Policy Reform Legislation, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://bit.ly/2GZP4yj.
89. See SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 5–6.
90. See, e.g., Amy Mazurek, Attitudes and Influences Regarding the Legalization of
Medical Marijuana, 19 IND. U. S. BEND UNDERGRADUATE RES. J. 105, 110 (2019)
(discussing how voter preferences regarding medical marijuana are impacted by variables
such as “the highest level of education, knowledge of benefits and side effects, past use,
and whether respondents have minor children”).
91. See State Laws, NORML.ORG, https://norml.org/laws (last visited Apr. 18, 2020);
see also Marijuana Overview, supra note 84; State Marijuana Map, supra note 86.
92. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 84 (noting that “[t]wenty-six states and the
District of Columbia have decriminalized small amounts of marijuana,” which means that
small amounts of marijuana “are a civil or local infraction, not a state crime”); see also
German Lopez, 15 states have decriminalized–but not legalized–marijuana, VOX (July 10,
2019, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/2v3Hpwd; Tom Murse, Decriminalization Versus
Legalization of Marijuana, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/382isA3 (defining
decriminalization as “a loosening of criminal penalties imposed for personal marijuana use
even though the manufacturing and sale of the substance remain illegal” and legalization
as the “lifting or abolishment of laws banning the possession and personal use of
marijuana”).
93. See Mazurek, supra note 90, at 110; see also Natalie Fertig, The Great American
Cannabis Experiment, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2019), https://politi.co/3bk6i7e (discussing how
generational alignments impact support for marijuana legislation); Sarah Trumble et al.,
All State Marijuana Laws Are Not Created Equal, THIRD WAY (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2Kj1hzS.
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circumstances.94 Consequently, disparate state laws affirm that the unique
needs of each state legislature produce inherently individualized laws,
which in turn also explains why there is often little appetite for interstate
cooperation.95 Additionally, the inconsistent use of prosecutorial
discretion to uphold federal law is another critical consideration to
understand the individualized nature and inherent tension surrounding
state marijuana legislation.96
4.

Prosecutorial Discretion and Marijuana Use

The term “prosecutorial discretion” refers to a federal prosecutor’s
ability to decide when to file criminal charges on behalf of the federal
government.97 Prosecutorial discretion is an important legal tool for law
enforcement officials.98 However, the unpredictable nature of
prosecutorial discretion can also create confusion that negatively impacts
the rule of law. Such concerns are especially true when the same federal
laws are enforced differently in certain states or even within subsections
of the same state.99 Federal courts can also contribute to existing confusion
by presuming that federal prosecutors use their discretion in good faith,
which in turn impacts individual states, federal judicial districts, and the
broader American legal system.100
Under the current federal structure, the President of the United States
nominates the United States Attorney General (“Attorney General”).101
Once confirmed by the Senate, the Attorney General establishes the
internal priorities of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and communicates
94. See State Marijuana Map, supra note 86.
95. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 239–41.
96. See infra Section II.B.4.
97. See Prosecutorial Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
98. See Stephanos Bibas, The Need For Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. &
C.R. 369, 372 (2010).
99. See W. RANDOLPH TESLIK, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO
CHARGE 12–15 (1975), https://bit.ly/323IC2X; see also Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial
Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 292 (1987) (discussing
three areas of “unfettered discretion” for prosecuting attorneys: “(1) the circumstances
under which a criminal charge will be filed; (2) the level at which an alleged offender will
be charged; and (3) when to discontinue prosecution.”); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial
Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 613
(2019); 9-27.000–Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://bit.ly/37qTyIZ (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
100. See Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 81 GEO. L.J. 853,
1029 (1993) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is due in part to a “regard for the
separation of powers doctrine and in part because courts recognize that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review”); see also West v. Holder, 60 F. Supp.
3d 197, 203 (2015) (“[The government’s] broad discretion rests largely on the recognition
that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” (quoting Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
101. See Office of the Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/ag (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
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those preferences to 93 United States Attorneys (“U.S. Attorneys”)
throughout the country.102 Finally, each U.S. Attorney implements
individualized procedures and strategies that embody the Attorney
General’s guidance and impact how Assistant United States Attorneys
(“AUSAs”) address local issues in their respective regions.103
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is beneficial, but also largely
invisible and unreviewable.104 Prosecutorial discretion also allows
prosecutors to act as intermediaries between courts and the police by
selectively enforcing criminal laws and defining potential criminal
penalties “outside the formal legal system.”105 Heavy reliance on federal
prosecutorial discretion also creates a trickle-down system wherein the
guidance of the Attorney General is interpreted and applied through the
literal decisions of individual AUSAs.106
Prosecutorial discretion is not a perfect system, but it remains a
concept of modern social and legal importance for three reasons.107 First,
the decision to prosecute directly impacts individual criminal offenders.108
Second, the unpredictable nature of prosecutorial discretion can also
impact ancillary topics like employment and immigration laws,109 low-

102. See Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/2WyR0qA; U.S.
Attorneys Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/2SJHBZM.
103. See Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://bit.ly/38xsv0b.
104. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 594 (2001).
105. See id.; see also Jordan A. Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 504–05 (2016).
106. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Scope of Executive Power: The President,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction of Justice, and Congress, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 609,
616–18 & n.53 (2018) (“The Attorney General sets litigation policy for the DOJ and directs
United States Attorneys in litigation matters.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2012)).
107. See Green, supra note 99, at 601 (“Prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are
enormously important, whether they are made by an office categorically or ‘wholesale’ by
adopting policies for recurring situations, or they are made individually or ‘retail’ by one
or more prosecutors considering all the relevant and available facts on an ad hoc basis.”).
But see Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PENN. L. REV. 959, 1000–01 & n.162 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors utilize
structures that “create direct control and political accountability, promoting consistent
enforcement” (citing Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
to all Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), https://bit.ly/2HrIXDb)).
108. See Sklansky, supra note 105, at 484.
109. See Dora Lane & Anthony Hall, Working Though the Haze: What Legal
Marijuana Means for Nevada Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2IOAt9V; see also Sam Kamim, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of
Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 191 (2016).
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income communities,110 and financial markets.111 Finally, prosecutorial
discretion can impact the behavior of states, which in turn can either lead
to interstate cooperation or individualized conduct that exacerbates current
confusion.112 One example demonstrating how prosecutorial discretion
can impact state behavior involves the conflicting DOJ memos provided
by former Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole and former Attorney
General Jefferson B. Sessions.113
a.

The Cole Memo

In August 2013, then-Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
distributed an internal DOJ memorandum regarding the federal
enforcement of marijuana-related crimes (“Cole Memo”).114 Rather than
prosecuting every potential violation, the Cole Memo asked U.S.
Attorneys to reprioritize law enforcement efforts and to focus on eight
specific uses of marijuana.115 Additionally, the Cole Memo reaffirmed the

110. See Mona Zhang, Legal Marijuana Is A Boon To The Economy, Finds Study,
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/2QSirVQ (highlighting that in Pueblo
County, Colorado, “[r]esearchers found that legalizing marijuana had a positive impact on
the economy . . . [and] a taxed and regulated cannabis industry contributed more than $58
million to the local economy,” including “$420,000 to scholarships for 210 students”); see
also Mrinalini Krishna, The Economic Benefits of Legalizing Weed, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec.
11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2BdTUUm (highlighting benefits such as the creation of tax
revenue, local income and job opportunities, financial investment opportunities, and
federal law enforcement savings).
111. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 597, 597 (2015) (“[A]lthough the United States’ dual banking system comprises
both federal- and state-chartered institutions, when it comes to marijuana banking, federal
regulation is pervasive and controlling.”); Steven Mare, He Who Comes Into Court Must
Not Come With Green Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle With The
Illegality And Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2016)
(highlighting that in 2015, Colorado marijuana sales generated $135 million in state tax
revenue).
112. See Kreit, supra note 82, at 693-95 (explaining that prosecutorial discretion has
created a confusing “top-down” marijuana non-enforcement policy that could result in “no
ex post facto bar to prosecuting marijuana business operators for conduct they undertook
while the nonenforcement prosecutorial guidance was in effect”); see also OSBECK &
BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 240–43.
113. See infra Sections II.B.4.a–.b; see also Attorney General: Jeff Sessions, U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UZAMFE; Former Deputy Attorney General
James Cole, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE ARCHIVES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/38u2JKg.
114. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
for all United States Att’y’s (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo]; see also Dep’t of
Justice Press Release Regarding Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice for all United States Att’y’s (Aug. 29, 2013), https://bit.ly/2kMC3w9
[hereinafter Cole Guidance Summary].
115. Cole Memo, supra note 114 (identifying eight enforcement areas for federal
prosecutors to prioritize: marijuana distribution to minors, the receipt of marijuana sales
revenue by organized crime and gangs, the diversion of marijuana from states where its
use is legal into other states, use of state-allowed marijuana use as a front for broader
trafficking, marijuana-related violence, drugged driving and the exacerbation of public
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criminalization and illegality of marijuana under the CSA, while also
implying that most marijuana infractions should not be prosecuted if they
occur within states with marijuana-friendly laws.116
Although the Cole Memo is a topic of significant legal discussion,
only three points are worth noting herein. First, the Cole Memo expressly
prioritized state legislation over pre-existing federal law.117 Second, the
Cole Memo demonstrated that prosecutorial discretion could narrow the
impact of federal law without actually changing the law itself.118 Finally,
the Cole Memo implicitly encouraged states to circumvent the
bureaucracy of Congress by legalizing marijuana via state law without any
guarantee of federal support in the future.119 While the Cole Memo did not
produce new law,120 the memo did lead to internal confusion within the
DOJ and amongst state legislatures.121

health concerns, marijuana growth and production on public lands, and the possession or
use of marijuana on federal property).
116. See Mare, supra note 111, at 1357 (“Cole cautioned that the federal government
and the DOJ do still have the right to interfere should they wish to, explaining that ‘[i]f
state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust . . . the federal government may seek
to . . . bring individual enforcement actions, including criminal prosecutions.’” (quoting
Cole Memo, supra note 114)).
117. Kreit, supra note 82, at 693-95.
118. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 372.
119. See SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 2 (“The [Cole] memorandum implied
that the federal government’s drug enforcement priorities would likely not include
prosecuting individuals or organizations engaged in marijuana activities that are conducted
in clear compliance with state laws that permit and regulate them.”); see also Rosalie Winn,
Note, Hazy Future: The Impact of Federal and State Legal Dissonance on Marijuana
Business, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 223-25 (2016) (“While the guidance memos do offer
some insight into federal enforcement, they do not offer marijuana businesses certainty as
a defense against individual prosecutions. Moreover, enforcement priorities and guidance
may change with future presidential administrations, further undermining the ability of
marijuana businesses to rely on the guidance.”).
120. See Cole Guidance Summary, supra note 114 (providing an update to the DOJ’s
“federal marijuana enforcement policy”).
121. See id. (“The Cole Memo reflected presidential control over a broad law
enforcement policy tempered by federalism concerns. As long as states attempted to stop
behavior that triggered the federal government’s enforcement priorities, state and local law
enforcement would largely be left to address marijuana-related activity. The Cole Memo
concluded by indicating that it did not guarantee that CSA violations that did not
contravene the DOJ’s enforcement priorities would be immune from prosecution.”); see
also Brad Auerbach, How Cannabis Entrepreneurs Feel About Sessions’ Reversal of the
Cole Memo, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2018, 7:32 PM), https://bit.ly/2t8yZiK; Hilary Bricken,
Reading the Pot Leaves: What the Sessions Memo Means for Marijuana in the U.S., ABOVE
LAW (Jan. 8, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://bit.ly/2D73MCk; Sadie Gurman, Pot stocks plummet
as Sessions takes aim at cannabis, BNN BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2St2CK8; Nick Wing & Ryan J. Reilly, Marijuana Industry Not Freaking Out
Over the Threat of Federal Crackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2RnrIdz.
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The Sessions Memo

In January 2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions issued
a new marijuana-related memorandum (“Sessions Memo”) in order to
rescind the guidance set forth in the Cole Memo and to reaffirm the
validity of the CSA.122 Above all, the Sessions Memo reflected a “return
to the rule of law”123 and reiterated that marijuana is still a harmful
substance that is closely connected to violent crime and gang-related
enterprises.124 The Sessions Memo also reminded U.S. Attorneys to
uphold current federal drug laws, even when differing state law exists.125
Although the Sessions Memo suggested that state marijuana legislation
would no longer be permitted, the memo’s impact has varied across states
and even spurred bipartisan congressional support for state marijuana
legislation.126
At the time of this writing, different forms of state marijuana
legislation and prosecutorial inconsistency still exist among the states.127
The Sessions Memo also remains valid, even though the desire to
prosecute state-compliant marijuana-related activity is uncommon and
often unclear.128 To supplement existing scholarship involving state
marijuana legislation,129 this Comment utilizes game theory to evaluate
122. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice for
all United States Att’y’s (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memo]; see also Dep’t of
Justice Press Release Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice for all United States Att’y’s (Jan. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CV2etq (rescinding prior
DOJ guidance and explicitly directing the renewed enforcement of federal marijuana laws)
[hereinafter Sessions Guidance Summary].
123. Sessions Guidance Summary, supra note 122.
124. See id. (“This return to the rule of law is also a return of trust and local control
to federal prosecutors who know where and how to deploy Justice Department resources
most effectively to reduce violent crime, stem the tide of the drug crisis, and dismantle
criminal gangs.”).
125. See id.; see also Wick Sollers et al., DOJ Issues Updated U.S. Attorneys’
Manual, A.B.A. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://bit.ly/38ykvMq (noting that the Sessions Memo can
be found in Section 1-17.000 of the revised Justice Manual, which solidifies the DOJ’s
“commitment to this approach”).
126. See, e.g., Chronic Dispute: What The Sessions Marijuana Memo Means For
Employers, FISHER PHILLIPS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2OZZfr1 (“[T]he legality of
marijuana use remains confusing, to say the least: it is dependent on the state you are in”);
Senator Cory Gardner, Gardner Defends States’ Rights on Senate Floor, YOUTUBE (Jan.
4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Rrb1y2; Elizabeth Wittemyer, The Sessions Memo: Its Legal and
Financial Implications, MARIJUANA EDUC. INITIATIVE, https://bit.ly/39Dbhyr (last visited
Feb. 16, 2020).
127. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text; see also LAMPE, supra note 76,
at 23–29 (discussing the current “marijuana policy gap”); THE MARIJUANA POLICY GAP
AND THE PATH FORWARD, supra note 72, at 11–20.
128. See Tom Firestone, The Sessions Memorandum: Two Years Later, BAKER
MCKENZIE: GLOBAL CANNABIS COMPLIANCE BLOG (Jan. 6, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yb8eQu.
129. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 6, at 116–20 (discussing the utilization
of “cooperative federalism”); Kreit, supra note 82, at 699–711 (offering three proposals to
“solve the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws”).
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state conduct and to discuss why interstate cooperation should be a critical
priority going forward.130
C.

Game Theory

Game theory refers to “a theoretical framework to conceive social
situations among competing players and produce optimal decision-making
of independent and competing [rational] actors in a strategic setting.”131 In
practical terms, game theory is a “science of strategy” that makes
assumptions and attempts to determine the optimal decision in an
otherwise difficult situation.132
Game theory cannot predict the future, but the repetitive use of game
theory models can be used to identify actor “identities, preferences, and
available strategies and how these strategies affect the outcome” of
complex social situations.133 For example, game theory principles can
offer insights into human decision-making134 and a variety of other
practical topics including “psychology, evolutionary biology, war,
politics, economics, and business.”135
130. See infra Section II.C.
131. See Adam Hayes, Game Theory, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3bCIqfw; Daniel McNulty, The Basics of Game Theory, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov.
13, 2019), https://bit.ly/2joiVVu [hereinafter McNulty Basics]; see also Kenneth Chang,
Explaining a Cornerstone of Game Theory: John Nash’s Equilibrium, N.Y. TIMES (May
24, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2yPT80z (highlighting that game theory is “essentially the study
of how to come up with a winning strategy in the game of life — especially when you do
not know what your competitors are doing and the choices do not always look promising”).
132. Hayes, supra note 131 (suggesting that game theory leads to strategic decisionmaking that can resolve issues irrespective of the conduct of “competing actors”).
133. See id. (explaining that game theory “helps to predict likely outcomes when
[actors] engage in certain behaviors”) (emphasis added); see also G. Owen, Game Theory,
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 5863, 5868
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001); Angela M. Koos, Game theory and its
practical applications 6–7 (May 1, 1997) (unpublished Presidential Scholars Thesis,
University of Northern Iowa) (on file with the University of Northern Iowa Honors
Program) (noting that the Prisoner’s Dilemma “is a universal concept that has practical
applications to biology, psychology, sociology, economics, law, and other disciplines
where a conflict of interests may exist”); John Cassidy, The Triumph (and Failure) of John
Nash’s Game Theory, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2015), https://bit.ly/2ALBhJm; Dana
Trexler Smith & Gary H. Levin, The Benefits of Game Theory in Negotiations and
Mediations, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 6, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/33AErN0.
134. McNulty Basics, supra note 131 (defining a “game” as “[a]ny set of
circumstances that has a result dependent on the actions of two of more decision-makers
(players)”).
135. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY 22 (2009) (explaining that game theory can be used to understand “firms
competing for business, political candidates competing for votes, jury members deciding a
verdict, [and even] long-term relationships”); Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game
Theory and the Law 2 (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, Working Paper
No. 22, 1994) (“Game theory is a set of tools and a language for describing and predicting
strategic behavior.”); Elvis Picardo, How Game Theory Strategy Improves Decision
Making, INVESTOPEDIA (May 19, 2019), https://bit.ly/2wnuANZ; Jesus Rodriguez, Game

2020 MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: GAME THEORY & INTERSTATE COOP.

789

In contrast to the proposed benefits of game theory, critics argue that
game theory offers minimal practical value because it relies upon
unrealistic assumptions that cannot apply in modern society.136 Some
critics even question whether cooperation is necessary at all.137 However,
such criticisms inappropriately focus on the limitations of game theory
without recognizing the practical value that can be gleaned from its use.
Game theory cannot predict the future, nor is it a formal “scientific theory”
like those used in scientific laboratories.138 In reality, game theory is a
practical tool that offers social benefit by helping to “determine the most
likely outcomes” in real-life situations involving “known payouts or
quantifiable consequences.”139
1.

Basic Assumptions

Several different game theories exist.140 This Comment solely
considers the principles of non-cooperative game theory to understand
why “rational individuals make decisions” to achieve their own goals.141
Non-cooperative games can implicate a range of situations, from a
childhood game “Rock-Paper-Scissors,” to international conflicts, to
collective state actions seeking to avoid nuclear proliferation.142 Despite
Theory for Data Scientists, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/31XEQIq
(“The history of game theory is attached to the history of computer science.”).
136. See ANTHONY KELLY, DECISION MAKING USING GAME THEORY 1 (2003)
(explaining that game theory models do not reflect “the social reality of decision making”);
see also McNulty Basics, supra note 131 (discussing the need for basic assumptions like
“rationality” and “maximization”).
137. See, e.g., Emily Singer, Game Theory Calls Cooperation into Question, QUANTA
MAG. (Feb. 11, 2015), https://bit.ly/2OZLZTf; KELLY, supra note 136, at 174–80 (offering
a critique of game theory assumptions).
138. See Cassidy, supra note 133 (“[Game theory] is an intellectual tool—a way of
organizing our thoughts systematically, applying them in a consistent manner, and ruling
out errors. Like Marshallian supply-and-demand analysis or Bayesian statistics, it can be
applied to many different problems, and its utility depends on the particular context.”); see
also Bryn Farnsworth, Game Theory and Human Behavior: Introduction and Examples,
IMOTIONS: BLOG (Aug. 21, 2018), https://bit.ly/2vzxwqv.
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
140. See Hayes, supra note 131 (noting that various game theory types exist,
including: symmetric/asymmetric, simultaneous/sequential, cooperative/non-cooperative).
141. Id. (“Noncooperative game theory deals with how rational economic agents deal
with each other to achieve their own goals.”); see also AVINAHSH K. DIXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS
AND LIFE 12 (2008) (predicting how people will behave by assessing choices in a presumed
non-moral and non-ethical context); GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND
APPLICATIONS 1-2 (1997) (requiring assumptions about individualism, rationality, and
mutual interdependence).
142. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also Peter Revesz, A Game-Theoretic Analysis
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 97–98 (Nov. 1, 2014)(unpublished manuscript)(on
file with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Library system); Andreas Kluth, The Risk of
Nuclear Proliferation (and War) Is Growing, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 9, 2020, 2:00
AM), https://bloom.bg/2wtxGjU.
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the name, non-cooperative game theory does not assert that cooperation is
impossible.143 Instead, non-cooperative game theory merely presumes that
insufficient incentives make cooperation highly unlikely.144
Importantly, the success of non-cooperative game theory requires
users to have a sufficient understanding of actor goals and priorities.145
Accordingly, three basic presumptions must be considered to properly
apply non-cooperative game theory to modern marijuana legislation:
individualism, rationality, and mutual interdependence.146 Individualism
refers to the notion that non-cooperative game theory best applies to
situations involving parties who act out “of their own [self] interest,”
regardless of the impacts on others.147 Non-cooperative games also assume
that players will always act rationally in order to avoid jeopardizing their
self-interests.148 Finally, mutual interdependence refers to the presumption
that “the welfare of any one individual in a game is, at least partially,
determined by the actions of other players in the game.”149
2.

The Nash Equilibrium

When game theory models evaluate the potential conduct of relevant
actors under specific conditions, that analysis results in an interactive
143. See E. van Damme, Game Theory: Noncooperative Games, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 5873, 5873 (Neil J. Smelser &
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (“A game is said to be noncooperative if there are no possibilities
for commitment (unilateral or multilateral) outside the rules of the game. In contrast, in
cooperative games, players can form coalitions with the possibilities for doing so not being
explicitly modeled within the rules of the game.”); see also Non-Cooperative Games,
SYSTEMS INNOVATION, https://bit.ly/2uPNyMO (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
144. See Non-Cooperative Games, supra note 143.
145. See Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 285, 300 (1991) (“A better understanding of key concepts, such as
competition, collusion, efficiency, inside information, fair division, and fiduciary
responsibility is where the contribution of game theoretic thought can be significant. The
contribution of game theory to the law comes in the form of a new language to aid in the
understanding of conflict, competition, collusion, and cooperation.”).
146. See ROMP, supra note 141, at 1–4 (noting that assumptions are only problematic
“if the results based on [those] assumption[s] are found to be unhelpful”); see also Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2000); Brian Martin,
The Selective Usefulness of Game Theory, 8 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 85, 91–94 (1978)
(discussing the underlying values of game theory); Cassidy, supra note 133 (“[T]he Nash
criteria doesn’t necessarily give the correct answer, [but] it often rules out a lot of
implausible [answers], and it usually helps pin down the logic of the situation.”).
147. See Theodore L. Turocy & Berhard von Stengel, Game Theory 4-7 (London Sch.
of Econ., Working Paper No. LSE-CDAM-2001-09, 2001), https://bit.ly/2ycS7Ac; see also
ROMP, supra note 141, at 19 (noting that actors assume that unselfish behavior will offer
“no incremental benefit” because everyone else will naturally act in selfish ways).
148. See Picker, supra note 135, at 2 (explaining how game theory originates from
classical microeconomics, which presumed that individual decisionmakers would seek to
“maximize[] utility or profits subject to constraints”).
149. Id. at 4.
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evaluation called a “game.”150 Although innumerable variables can exist
and impact real life situations, every game eventually results in an
outcome where no player can improve his or her payoff through a
unilateral change in conduct.151 This eventual outcome is referred to as the
“Nash Equilibrium,” in honor of its inventor, the American mathematician
John Nash.152
Importantly, the Nash Equilibrium is not realized by simply waiting
for a situation to play out.153 Instead, deliberate steps must be taken to
“find” the Nash Equilibrium and to thereby derive meaning from the game
for future application in real-life situations.154 Although the Nash
Equilibrium is best known as an economic tool,155 the Nash Equilibrium
is a “decision-making theorem” that applies to a host of different real-life
situations156 and also enjoys popularity through modern film157 and its
practical value when applied to situations best described as a “Prisoner’s
Dilemma.”158

150. Hayes, supra note 131; KELLY, supra note 136, at 1 (“[G]ames like chess and
bridge fall within the ambit of game theory, but so do many other social situations which
are not commonly regarded as games in the everyday sense of the word.”).
151. See Hayes, supra note 131 (“It can also be thought of as ‘no regrets,’ in the sense
that once a decision is made, the player will have no regrets concerning decisions
considering the consequences.”); see also James Chen, Nash Equilibrium, INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yR1rJh (“Nash equilibrium is a concept within game theory
where the optimal outcome of a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from their
initial strategy.”).
152. See John Nash – American Mathematician, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June
9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2xClf1m (offering an overview of John Nash and his
accomplishments within the field of economic game theory); see also Charles A. Holt &
Alvin E. Roth, The Nash equilibrium: A Perspective, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
3999, 4000 (2004).
153. Daniel McNulty, Game Theory: Beyond the Basics, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25,
2019), https://bit.ly/3dlzkVu.
154. See id. (providing a standard three-step process to “find” the Nash Equilibrium).
155. See Chen, supra note 151; see also John Wooders, John Nash and his
contribution to Game Theory and Economics, CONVERSATION (May 26, 2015, 3:13 AM),
https://bit.ly/2Q4iRcb.
156. See Chen, supra note 151.
157. See A Beautiful Mind, IMDB, https://imdb.to/2HvsGgq (last visited Feb. 16,
2020); see also Patricia Bauer, A Beautiful Mind, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 13,
2017), https://bit.ly/2qg8s1R (offering a synopsis of the film and John’s innovative work
despite prolonged mental illness); Chang, supra note 131 (explaining that one infamous
scene in the film, “A Beautiful Mind,” is when John Nash conceived the Nash Equilibrium
by realizing that unselfish cooperation could allow a group of young men to gain the
attention of a beautiful, blonde female and her friends in a local bar).
158. See Chen, supra note 151; see also Ben Duronio, 7 Easy Ways to Use Game
Theory to Make Your Life Better, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2012, 2:43 PM),
https://read.bi/2DlLMWk (listing practical uses for the Nash Equilibrium, such as salary
negotiations, purchasing a car, making money in stock markets, real estate negotiations,
fantasy sports, poker games, and auctions); S.K., What is the Nash equilibrium and why
does it matter?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://econ.st/2RllZ3k (“[The Nash
Equilibrium] helps economists work out how competing companies set their prices, how
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

The Prisoner’s Dilemma game refers to “a paradox in decision
analysis in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not
produce the optimal outcome.”159 Additionally, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game is often used to analyze situational decision making, especially when
actors are confronted with imperfect information.160 When applying the
Nash Equilibrium to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both parties “will make the
move that is best for them individually but worse for them collectively.”161
In other words, both players will betray each other out of self-interest,
rather than cooperating to achieve more superior results.162
Similar to other game theory games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma involves
a set of basic assumptions and stereotypes that do not always reflect the
reality of modern society.163 However, the use of stereotypes and
assumptions to predict actor behavior is a critical step in the process.164
When proper assumptions are used to evaluate real-life social issues like
state marijuana legislation, game theory games will not specifically predict
how particular states will act, but they can help better understand why
states act in particular ways today and how those aggregated decisions will
lead to likely outcomes in the future.165
II.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Both federalism and the Constitution presume that disagreements
between state and federal law will occur,166 but neither topic explains how
to resolve the tensions that arise when states blatantly ignore existing
federal law.167 Additionally, increasing social support for the use and
governments should design auctions to squeeze the most from bidders and how to explain
the sometimes self-defeating decisions that groups make.”).
159. See Jim Chappelow, Prisoner’s Dilemma, INVESTOPEDIA (May 23, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2RQJjZv.
160. Hayes, supra note 131 (“Consider the example of two criminals arrested for a
crime. Prosecutors have no hard evidence to convict them. However, to gain a confession,
officials remove the prisoners from their solitary cells and question each one in separate
chambers. Neither prisoner has the means to communicate with each other. Officials
present four deals, often displayed as a 2 x 2 box.”); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 312-13 (2d ed. 1995).
161. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also Elvis Picardo, The Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Business and the Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yPLnrq (“[The]
Prisoner’s dilemma basically provides a framework for understanding how to strike a
balance between cooperation and competition, and is a very useful tool for strategic
decision-making.”).
162. See Hayes, supra note 131.
163. See id.
164. See ROMP, supra note 141, at 1–4.
165. OSBORNE, supra note 135, at 13 (noting that actors are affected by the actions of
all other related actors, which can lead to aggregate change over time).
166. See supra Section II.A.
167. See supra Section II.B.3.
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possession of marijuana does not change the fact that state marijuana
legislation directly contradicts the CSA.168 Although state marijuana
legislation is currently tolerated by the federal government, the
legalization of marijuana still creates tensions that neither federalism, nor
the Constitution, can adequately address alone.169
The disparity between state and federal law is not all bad.
Importantly, the confusion caused by state marijuana legislation can lead
to positive social change if handled correctly. With that belief in mind, this
Comment argues that states must utilize game theory to better understand
complex social situations and to also identify effective solutions in the
future. When used to evaluate state marijuana legislation, the effective use
of game theory can lead to a better understanding of state and federal
priorities, which in turn offers predictability and incentivizes interstate
cooperation in the future.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is also particularly relevant to this
discussion because state marijuana legislation is a non-cooperative social
situation that involves self-interested conduct, inadequate information,
and a “zero-sum” mentality.170 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is also well-suited
to address other complex interstate issues involving similar social and
legal complexities.171 Ultimately, state marijuana legislation is not just
about the legalization of marijuana.172 Instead, the use of marijuana raises
a number of legal, political, social, economic, and medical interests that
can either help or hurt modern American society.173 Thus, this Comment
utilizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma to demonstrate that the current lack of
cooperation between states must be improved in order to better address
complex social issues in the future.174

168. See supra Section II.B.2.
169. See supra Sections II.A–.B; see also Angela Dills et al., Dose of Reality: The
Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations, CATO INST. (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://bit.ly/3b2Bjfn (discussing initial legislative predictions and how views have
changed over time); Sarah Trumble & Nathan Kasai, America’s Marijuana Revolution,
THIRD WAY (Aug. 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/3aV3RY7.
170. See supra Section II.C.3; see also Kenton, supra note 27.
171. See Stearns, supra note 53, at 6–7; see also Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 210–
11 (2009) (arguing that “legal scholars are nearly obsessed with the Prisoners’ Dilemma,
. . . [while] virtually ignoring other equally simple games offering equally sharp insights
into legal problems.”).
172. See Status Report, supra note 87.
173. See Liberty Vittert, Opinion: Here’s what the numbers show about the impact
of legal marijuana, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 19, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://on.mktw.net/2Ua1eeg;
see also Judith Grisel, Pot Holes: Legalizing Marijuana is Fine, But Don’t ignore the
Science on its Dangers, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://wapo.st/2xJCj9X; Dan
Hyman, When the Law Says Using Marijuana Is O.K., but the Boss Disagrees, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2WeBCzl.
174. See supra Sections III.A–.B.
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Modeling the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma

The regulation of marijuana is a source of significant social and legal
disagreement between American citizens, state governments, federal law
enforcement agencies, and even Congress.175 After years of federal
criminalization, some state legislatures and even a few federal agencies,
such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), now recognize
the potential benefits of marijuana in modern society.176 Additionally,
rising public support for the medicinal and recreational use of marijuana
suggests that both state and federal legalization is an inevitable reality at
some point in the future.177 Accordingly, the question is not whether
marijuana will become legal, but how and when a sweeping change will
occur.178
State marijuana legislation also illustrates the issues that can arise
when states function as solitary creatures within an inherently federal
system.179 More specifically, the fact that states often prioritize their
individual goals to the detriment of neighboring states is concerning and
often forecloses the possibility of social progress.180 Consequently, the
application of game theory can help to address state marijuana legislation,
as well as the need for progressive social change through informed
decision-making and strategic cooperation amongst states.181
1.

General Assumptions

To accurately assess state marijuana legislation using the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, two preparatory steps are required. The first step is to
identify the actors. The second step is to make general assumptions
regarding each actor’s motivations and expected conduct.182 In this game,
the first actor is a hypothetical state that supports the legal use of marijuana
through state legislation (“State X”). The second actor is the local United
States Attorney’s Office, which is overseen by a U.S. Attorney who will
prosecute federal marijuana crimes in State X based on guidance from the

175. See supra Section II.B.
176. See State Marijuana Map, supra note 86; see also FDA Regulation of Cannabis
and Cannabis-Derived Products, Including Cannabidiol (CBD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
AGENCY (Mar. 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Jbr2kR; Several marijuana-related bills pending
in Congress, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/36mPRDM.
177. See Kyle Jaeger, Federal Marijuana Action Is An “Inevitability,” Trump FDA
Chief Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Nov. 19, 2018), https://bit.ly/39bzLhy (providing a clip
of FDA Chief Scott Gottlieb’s interview on CNBC); see also Hartig & Geiger, supra note
87.
178. Mona Zhang, Marijuana legalization may hit 40 states. Now what?, POLITICO
(Jan. 20, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://politi.co/3agoka0.
179. See supra Sections II.A–.B.
180. See infra Sections III.B–.C.
181. See infra Section III.C.
182. See supra Section II.C.1.
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Attorney General. Both actors will also act rationally, despite having
incomplete information about the motivations and actions of the other side.
The next step is to determine the general motivations of each actor,
including how each actor will attempt to satisfy their individual goals
within the game. Because actual future conduct will be unknown, each
party will presumptively act selfishly by seeking to achieve their
respective goals without concern for the other side. This game will also
assume that no marijuana legislation currently exists in State X, even
though local citizens are supportive of laws that legalize the medicinal and
recreational use of marijuana.
The final step is to consider the expected conduct of each actor. In
this example, State X is presumptively aware of the CSA, but the officials
of State X also want to appease their citizens who support the legalization
of marijuana. Similar to modern state legislatures, State X is unsure how
to draft state legislation that will appease marijuana advocates, while also
protecting disinterested citizens from harm. State X also knows that other
states have passed marijuana-related legislation without adverse results,
but also remains unsure if the local U.S. Attorney will pursue marijuanarelated crimes in the future.
Alternatively, the U.S. Attorney is presumptively aware of State X’s
plans to pass marijuana-related legislation in the future. Unbeknownst to
State X, the U.S. Attorney also plans to enforce all federal laws in State X,
including the CSA as discussed in the Sessions Memo.183 The U.S.
Attorney also understands that if State X does indeed pass marijuana
legislation, then he or she must decide how to properly allocate manpower
to effectively prosecute marijuana-related activities in State X.
2.

Identifying the “Nash Equilibrium”

Based on the assumptions mentioned, a Prisoner’s Dilemma exists
because State X and the U.S. Attorney have conflicting goals and
imperfect information regarding the plans of the other side.184
Consequently, the critical next step is to determine the Nash Equilibrium,
or the point at which both parties will have no incentive to deviate from
their self-interested strategies.185 Notably, State X and the U.S. Attorney
could work together to find a reasonable solution that would meet
individual and collective needs. Unfortunately, cooperation is unlikely
because State X is accountable to its citizens and the U.S. Attorney must
follow the mandate of the Attorney General. If State X declines to pass
marijuana legislation, voters would likely remove current state politicians
from office. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney serves at the pleasure of the
183. See supra Section II.B.4.b.
184. See supra Section II.B.
185. See supra Section II.C.2.
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Attorney General and could be removed from office for failing to follow
the mandates set forth by the Attorney General.
According to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both actors will “betray” each
other by prioritizing the goals of their relevant stakeholders without regard
to the impact on the other side.186 Because the potential benefit of
compromise is overshadowed by the need to satisfy respective
stakeholders, State X will prioritize the desires of its citizens over the risk
of potential litigation by the U.S. Attorney. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney
will prioritize the enforcement of federal law by prosecuting marijuanarelated crimes until internal guidance is changed or until the CSA is
modified. While the decisions of State X and the U.S. Attorney represent
modern reality, neither approach is ideal. Additionally, the fact that
cooperation is unlikely does not mean that a cooperative relationship
cannot exist.
B.

Analyzing the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Prisoner’s Dilemma game presumes that self-interest will prevail
over cooperation.187 In fact, all game theory models rely on assumptions
that may not completely reflect the realities of “real-life.”188 In noncooperative games, actors are presumed to make “rational” decisions that
incentivize cooperation in specific circumstances.189 In reality, the
decision to cooperate is often more complex and unpredictable than game
theory suggests.190
As previously mentioned, this Comment does not argue that game
theory can predict naturally unpredictable human behavior. In fact, the
popular belief that game theory can solve difficult problems in a matter of
minutes is utterly false. Instead, this Comment argues that game theory
can provide an enhanced understanding of real-life social issues that can
lead to new or improved solutions.
The hypothetical game between State X and the U.S. Attorney
highlights the inherent unpredictability of human behavior, as well as the

186. See supra Section II.C.3.
187. See supra Section II.B.4; see also Hayes, supra note 131.
188. See supra Section II.C.1; see also McNulty Basics, supra note 131.
189. See supra Section II.C.1; see also ROMP, supra note 141, at 2-3. But see Jim
Chappelow, Paradox of Rationality, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 1, 2019), https://bit.ly/2vLQomA
(explaining that “players who make irrational or naive choices often receive better payoffs
and that those making the rational choices . . . suggest[ing] that something more than purely
rational individual choice is at work”).
190. See, e.g., Max Nisen, They Finally Tested The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ On Actual
Prisoners — And The Results Were Not What You Would Expect, BUS. INSIDER (July 21,
2013, 4:01 PM), https://bit.ly/3bf1vU4; Picardo, supra note 161 (“The prisoner’s dilemma
shows us that mere cooperation is not always in one’s best interests. In fact, when shopping
for a big-ticket item such as a car, bargaining is the preferred course of action from the
consumers’ point of view.”) (emphasis added).
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need for certain assumptions.191 Even after careful preparation, this game
cannot guarantee that actors will act rationally, nor can it ensure that
expected outcomes will actually occur. Additionally, even if this game
correctly predicts future conduct, there is no guarantee that the assumed
motivations of the game are accurate. Consequently, the value of game
theory is not in a perfect prediction of human behavior, but rather in the
lessons gleaned from recurring models that offer both accurate and
inaccurate results.192
The hypothetical game discussed herein highlights two important
realities of modern society.193 First, the existence of rationality does not
necessarily stop actors from pursuing self-interested strategies, even when
there is a high risk of unknown consequences. Second, game theory relies
on assumptions and imperfect information, which means that even the best
games cannot perfectly predict how parties will act, regardless of whether
their interests align. In the hypothetical game discussed herein, both State
X and the U.S. Attorney made decisions that supported the interests of
their respective constituents. State X acted in a way that would likely
appease voters, while the U.S. Attorney sought to appease the Attorney
General. Each actor’s conduct also served deeper selfish interests. For
example, State X knew that happy voters would re-elect current politicians
to positions of power. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney sought to appease the
Attorney General in order to retain his or her position of appointment.
Although both actors shared similar goals, each actor still chose
independent approaches rather than strategic collaboration. Even though
the risk of potential failure could have been avoided through open
communication and strategic collaboration, both actors still rationally
chose to prioritize non-cooperative conduct in order to avoid limiting their
potential payoffs.
The purpose of the hypothetical game is to highlight the limitations
of game theory and the potential insights that game theory can offer. Even
in a controlled environment, the motivations of State X and the U.S.
Attorney are merely theories based on past conduct and current research.
Additionally, the game suggests that the potential benefits of cooperation
are often insufficient to encourage parties to prioritize strategic
cooperation.194 More broadly, the hypothetical demonstrates why game
191. See supra Section II.C.
192. See Owen, supra note 133, at 5868.
193. See supra Section III.B.
194. See Lisa Zyga, Deceptive Behavior May (Deceivingly) Promote Cooperation,
PHYS.ORG (Nov. 7, 2014), https://bit.ly/2wrOVlD (“Naively, one would expect that, the
better the radar of cooperators at identifying deceitful defectors, the better the conditions
for cooperation to evolve. But it is not necessarily so. If the cost of hiding is moderate, then
the extra cost of detection opens the door for even more defection.”); cf. Melissa L. Breger,
Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of Family Courts
Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. 55, 56

798

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:3

theory should be embraced as a tool that, when used proactively, can
increase understanding and potentially help avoid future issues before they
arise.195
C.

Recommendations Moving Forward

Game theory cannot force social change. In reality, game theory can
provide an increased understanding of complex individuals and situations,
in order to incentivize strategic cooperation among naturally selfish and
uncooperative parties.196 Accordingly, the practical value of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Nash Equilibrium is to demonstrate how and why
intentional cooperation can be used to achieve individual and collective
goals.197 Although the complex nature of game theory can be daunting,
true social change is not easy and cannot be achieved without significant
preparation.198 Similarly, a basic awareness of game theory will not offer
lasting solutions to complex social issues.199
In addition to preparation, states must also continue to act as
“laboratories” of democracy, while also identifying interstate
collaborative opportunities that will help to achieve individual and
collective goals.200 Additionally, two more-specific recommendations
should also be considered. First, federal and state legislators should
communicate with one another to discuss how legislation affects local
communities, states, and the nation. The distinction between state and
federal law is not an impenetrable barrier. The Constitution also
intrinsically ties independent governments together, which in turn implies
that cooperation is sensible for both practical and political reasons.

(2010) (arguing that the social psychology principal “groupthink” contributes to an
institutional courtroom culture that “too often stifles conversation and innovation, muffles
the voices of the disenfranchised, and serves as a disincentive for zealous legal advocacy”).
195. See McAdams, supra note 171, at 231 (“In a single equilibrium game, an
economic model can claim to account for the influence of history and culture by making
adjustments to the payoffs, which then uniquely determine how individuals will behave.
But the surprising result of a coordination game, or any game with multiple equilibria, is
that the payoffs, whatever they include, do not uniquely determine the behavior. Something
else besides payoffs can and does influence how people act.”).
196. See supra Section II.C.
197. See supra Section II.C; see also Stearns, supra note 53, at 5–8.
198. See McAdams, supra note 171, at 210–11.
199. See id.; see also Stearns, supra note 53, at 6–7 (discussing the fictional movie
“bar scene [that] reveals a coordination difficulty that the men appeared to confront in their
efforts to secure their individual objectives”); A Beautiful Mind Quotes, IMDB,
https://imdb.to/2QcWq4l (last viewed Apr. 20, 2020) (offering a transcript of the film’s
fictional bar scene, which simplifies the Nash Equilibrium for everyday users by
explaining: “If we all go for the blonde and block each other, not a single one of us is going
to get her. So then we go for her friends, but they will all give us the cold shoulder because
no one likes to be second choice. But what if none of us goes for the blonde? We won’t get
in each other’s way and we won’t insult the other girls. It’s the only way to win”).
200. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
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Although state and federal collaboration may not change the priorities of
Congress or current federal laws like the CSA, cooperation can lead to
productive conversations that refocus political efforts on the social issues
most pressing to the public majority.
Second, an interstate task force should be established to discuss
cross-border social issues, especially topics involving differing state and
federal laws. Involvement of the federal government should be considered,
but is not necessarily required. The interstate task force should focus on a
wide range of social issues that present current issues and future
cooperative opportunities amongst diverse states. Above all, the interstate
task force should be more than an academic body by attempting to resolve
specific social issues that will, in turn, eventually allow states to reclaim
basic rights and promised constitutional powers under the Tenth
Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
Game theory is a powerful tool, whose value can vary based upon the
preparation and skill of the user. When properly applied to complex social
situations, game theory can offer valuable insights into party motivations
and potential future conduct.201 Game theory can also help to explain why
parties make non-cooperative decisions, which in turn can be used to
employ strategies that avoid such an unnecessary result.
Game theory is also applicable to various facets of modern society.
Game theory can develop and incentivize informed decision-making,
including the desire to cooperate with diverse parties. This benefit is
especially important in social situations where parties often fall prey to
selfish, independent acts resulting in a Nash Equilibrium. Game theory can
also increase social understanding, which in turn can mitigate the tensions
posed by federalism and also promote interstate cooperation in the future.
While there is no simple solution to address the tensions and uncertainties
caused by state marijuana legislation, resolutions do exist if states are
willing to cooperate to avoid the unnecessary consequences of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.

201. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 146, at 1067 (discussing how game theory applies
to the old adage that “people usually act the way they do for a reason”).

